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Okinawa: a different Japan? 
A historian‘s perspective
Stanislaw Meyer (Jagiellonian University, Krakow) 
The question of whether Okinawa is Japan inevitably 
leads us to another one, namely what Japan is, it also cre-
ates a temptation to search for the essence of Japanese-
ness. Indeed, if we think of Japan in terms of sakura, sake, 
samurai, salaryman and sushi then definitely Okinawa 
is a different Japan. Sakura hardly blossom in Okinawa 
and does not even try to compete with local deigo1. The 
Okinawans do not drink nihonshu, but awamori2. Yes, 
they eat sushi, but above all they love pork. Time goes by 
much slower in Okinawa and punctuality is considered a 
rather rare virtue. With their easy going lifestyle the Oki-
nawans fit neither the image of hard-working salarymen 
nor stern samurai.
The list of stereotypes used to highlight a lack of 
compatibility between the two countries is as long as the 
Ryūkyū Archipelago. Among the more interesting ones 
are odd stories that the Okinawans do not speak Japanese, 
or that they do not use chopsticks but knives and forks. 
Not all stereotypes, however, are negative. Okinawa is 
also being portrayed as a “better” Japan – a tropical para-
dise, where one can relax from the stress of life in Japan 
proper. It is a “pacifist” Japan, without the ugly face of 
nationalism.
The question of “Japanese-ness” has long preoccu-
pied the attention of scholars. Whilst the prewar genera-
tion of scholars embarked on a mission to prove that Oki-
nawa was and always had been Japanese, their postwar 
critics took the opposite stance. Nevertheless, Okinawan 
studies were for many years kept hostage by a dichotomy 
of “Japan(ese) or not” and it has been only in the past two 
decades that scholars have reformulated their academic 
inquiries by simply asking what Okinawa is.
So, is Okinawa Japan or not? As a historian, I do not 
have a problem with answering this question. If it is highly 
inappropriate to dump the whole Ryūkyūan past into the 
same sack as Japan, then it is also wrong to deny that 
present-day Okinawa is Japan – even though a different 
one. One may say that Okinawa is an “invented tradition” 
of Japan, but “invented” does not mean “not true”. And 
even if Okinawa, hypothetically, should separate from 
Japan in the future (which I highly doubt), it will not be 
able to erase easily the Japanese chapter from its history.
The concept of “invented tradition” can tell us a great 
deal about how Okinawa has been made Japanese. This 
concept, introduced first by Eric Hobsbawm and Ter-
ence Ranger (1983), enjoyed a world-wide success, being 
adopted by many scholars, including Japanologists.3 The 
concept not only explains how people invent traditions in 
order to legitimize their rights to nationhood, but also how 
they invent the past. Put differently, “inventing traditions” 
concerns the problem of collective memory: what people 
want to remember and how they want it to be remem-
bered. Thus, the past serves as a “mirror of modernity” 
(Vlastos 1998), reflecting national values and virtues. It is 
a source of national identity. 
Okinawa was “invented” by the Japanese as well as 
the Okinawans. Japanese policymakers needed a justifica-
tion for the appropriation of the Ryūkyū Islands. Japanese 
scholars, obsessed with the idea of Japanese uniqueness, 
performed intellectual acrobatics to adjust Okinawa to 
their vision of Japanese civilization and race. And the 
Okinawans simply wanted to find some comfort to their 
troubled identity.
Okinawa as a reservoir of Japanese 
ancient traditions
Okinawa as a reservoir of Japanese ancient traditions was 
conceptualized in the 1920s by scholars who were highly 
concerned about the negative effects industrialization and 
modernization might have upon Japan. Since 1920 Japan 
was coping with a long economic crisis that made many 
people critically reconsider Japan’s relations with foreign 
countries and cultures. Some scholars, including Yana- 
gita Kunio, Yanagi Muneyoshi and Orikuchi Shinobu, 
believed that what Japan needed was not only a program 
for economic recovery, but also a cultural revival. In 
Yanagita’s eyes, for example, the reason for rural distress 
lay in the weakening of religious consciousness of the 
people.4 Hence scholars embarked on a mission to find 
an antidote for Japan’s ills. They found it in Okinawa – a 
country which they saw as being rich in relics of Japanese 
culture in its purest, unchanged form. They discovered in 
Okinawa archaic forms of the Japanese language, of Shin-
toism and art that unlike its Japanese counterparts had not 
been affected by influences from China and the West. 
“Things that have been lost in Japan proper”, Yanagita 
Kunio wrote, “are perfectly preserved on [Okinawa] 
island” (Yanagita 1997: 293). Okinawan customs and 
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beliefs, which were thought to reflect the spirit of ancient 
Japanese collectivity, were supposed to help the Japanese 
rediscover principles of social configuration. Okinawan 
dialects, on the other hand, were supposed to provide a 
solution for the ongoing corruption of the Japanese lan-
guage.
One needs to give credit to prewar scholars for 
depicting Okinawa in very positive colors, considering the 
fact that Japanese people of the time usually associated 
Okinawa with poverty and backwardness. Their attitude, 
however, was highly idealistic, if not paternalistic. In that 
sense they resembled Western scholars who were engaged 
in an anthropology of “rescuing cultures”. Being obsessed 
with the search for a “real” Japan they ignored the fact 
that Okinawa had developed its own genuine culture. In 
a manner typical of scholars representing the synchronic 
paradigm in anthropology, they put Okinawa outside the 
historical context, as if it was a land frozen in time.
Yanagi Muneyoshi’s Okinawa deserves special 
attention. Being deeply influenced by Buddhist philoso-
phy, Yanagi placed Okinawa within the context of a philo-
sophical discourse about the nature of art.5 He was pro-
foundly concerned with the negative effects of industri-
alization which, in his opinion, had brought about a rapid 
disappearance of art from people’s daily lives in Japan. 
He was displeased with the introduction of machinery 
into crafts, as people began to seek easy profits by pro-
ducing cheap but ugly wares. Yanagi believed that the 
main reason crafts were losing their beauty was that fine 
art had been separated from crafts, lost its utilitarian char-
acter and turned into art for art’s sake practiced only by 
specialized artists.
Thus, Yanagi began the search for perfect art: an 
art that was present in every aspect of human life; a per-
fect state of art where beauty was not separated from 
practicality, and where crafts and fine art constituted 
one whole; art that did not require any differentiation 
between its creators and recipients, or the artist and the 
public, as it was produced by all people, anonymous 
bearers of tradition. Such art was perfect because there 
was no dichotomy of beauty and ugliness; accordingly, 
beauty and ugliness were not separated but together con-
stituted one whole.
Yanagi believed that such art had existed in the 
remote past. He found one example of it in the poems of 
the Man’yōshū. The pursuit of perfect art led him to the 
peripheries of Japan, far away from the “center” which, 
he felt, was distorted by modernity. He found what he was 
looking for in the culture of the Ainu and in Okinawa. 
He considered Okinawan crafts and music superior to its 
Japanese counterparts in every respect. Full of enchant-
ment he wrote about Ryūkyūan dances:
[In Okinawa] everybody dances, everybody sings. The 
dances spring from the life of the people. The Japanese songs 
and dances of the Bon festival are also impressive, but less 
alive than these expressions of intensity of spirit. I beg you 
my readers to waste no time before coming to see such dance 
as this, whether of fishermen, or farmers, or the slow, quiet, 
and deep dances of the old court (Yanagi 1972: 165).
In Okinawa Yanagi found a remnant of perfect art 
which he would put in a museum and preserve it as it 
was. He was critical about the modernization of Japan, 
but after all he did not reject it and acknowledged that 
Japan was changing. He assigned to Okinawa the role of 
an antidote to the negative side effects of Japan’s mod-
ernization. Was Yanagi’s Okinawa entitled to undergo the 
same changes as Japan? Perhaps not. If it did, the antidote 
would lose its potency.
In a manner of speaking, Yanagita, Yanagi and others 
found in Okinawa the essence of Japanese culture. Yet 
they did not necessarily place Okinawa within the frame 
of Japan proper. They assigned to Okinawa only a passive 
role in the process of shaping Japan. Okinawa became a 
recipient of Yamato culture and its preserver, but it was 
Yamato, not Okinawa, that had created Japan.
Okinawa and the ideology of expansion
Generally speaking, the Japanese of the prewar genera-
tion did not show much interest in Okinawa. Okinawa 
was a remote and forgotten land with very few resources 
to offer. In terms of business opportunities it could not 
match neighboring Taiwan. Japanese public officials pre-
ferred going to Korea, perceived by many as a spring-
board for their careers. Academics, on the other hand, 
were too busy with their research on the mainland, and 
hence only a dozen of them noticed Okinawa at all.
The situation changed in the 1930s, when Japan 
engaged in the war with China and started preparing 
for a confrontation with Western powers over domi-
nation in Asia. The Japanese moved their eyes to the 
South and rediscovered Okinawa, which in many ways 
resembled the countries they wanted to colonize. Studies 
of nan’yōdo, or “southern seas countries” had a positive 
impact on Okinawan studies, and Okinawa itself took 
deeper roots in the consciousness of the Japanese people.
One aspect of this state of affairs was that some 
patriotic scholars began confusing ideology with schol-
arship and, consciously or not, subjugated their work to 
the political needs of the Japanese state. An Okinawan-
born historian, Higashionna Kanjun (1882–1963), openly 
glorified Japanese expansionism and supported the vision 
of Japan’s advance to the south by referring to the his-
tory of Ryūkyūan overseas trade. In his article “Hōshin 
motomeyo” (Let us demand a policy, 1939) he wrote that 
the Ryūkyūans had been imbued with the spirit of hakkō 
ichiu (“the whole world under one – Japanese – roof”)6 
(Higashionna 1978: 374). In a similar fashion Akiyama 
Kenzō described Ryūkyūan merchants as Japanese pio-
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neers who had advanced to the South (Akiyama 1939: 64–
94).
Needless to say, the spirit of hakkō ichiu qualifies as 
a typical “invented tradition” produced by an aggressive 
ideology of expansionism. What is remarkable is that this 
tradition was extended to the Ryūkyūan people. The Japa-
nese perceived themselves as the best qualified nation in 
Asia to colonize the world, with the most superior racial 
and cultural attributes. Okinawan people, on the other 
hand, were seen as “Japanese but not quite” – they were 
“country bumpkins” who first needed to be civilized and 
educated. This view was shared even by some Okinawan 
intellectuals which is why they eagerly supported the Jap-
anese policy of assimilation. But when Japan embarked 
on a colonial expansion in Asia, Japanese ideologists all 
of a sudden discovered truly Japanese virtues among the 
Okinawans’ ancestors.
Iha Fuyū’s vision of Okinawan history
Having accepted a new identity as Japanese nationals, 
the Okinawan people faced a dilemma of how to deal 
with their past. How was the history of their country, 
with no glorious episodes of samurai wars and without 
the poetical life of the Imperial Court in Kyōto, supposed 
to reassure them in their new identity? The first historian 
from Okinawa, Iha Fuyū (1876–1947),7 frankly admitted 
that through his works he intended to enhance Japanese 
patriotism among his countrymen and give some com-
fort to their troubled identity (Iha G. 1909). Iha depicted 
Ryūkyūan history in terms of first a separation from and 
then a reunification with Japan. The “Theory of a Common 
Japanese-Ryūkyūan Ancestry” (Nichiryū dōsoron), com-
bined with Social Darwinism, provided several useful 
arguments: Okinawans were Japanese by ancestry. By a 
strange twist of fate, however, in ancient times they had 
parted from the Japanese people and began to follow an 
independent path of development. The Ryūkyūan King-
dom experienced a short period of greatness in the 15th–
16th century, owing its prosperity to overseas trade, but 
in 1609 it was invaded by Lord Shimazu of the Satsuma 
domain in Japan. In the wake of this invasion, Ryūkyū 
entered a dark and miserable period of enslavement which 
lasted until the end of the 19th century. Satsuma’s policy of 
colonization resulted in a widening spiritual gap between 
the Japanese and the Ryūkyūans – the Japanese no longer 
perceived their Southern neighbors as their countrymen. 
Fortunately, the Meiji Government, by abolishing the 
Ryūkyū Kingdom, “liberated the Okinawan people from 
enslavement” (Iha 1974a: 493) and put their country back 
on the path of progress and prosperity. From the perspec-
tive of evolution, the reunification with Japan was not 
only desirable, but also inevitable.
In his early years Iha was highly optimistic about 
Okinawa’s future and believed that a quick assimilation 
with Japan would be the best solution for all social and 
economic problems. Yet, seeing the disastrous effects of 
the economic crisis that badly hit Okinawa in the 1920s, 
he had to revise his opinions about assimilation. He no 
longer believed that Japan provided the ultimate solu-
tion for Okinawa’s problems, but on the other hand he 
did not feel in a position to question the idea of national 
unification. Iha abandoned his ideas of social evolution; 
Okinawa was not proceeding on a path of progress any 
more, but rather helplessly floated in history, with no con-
trol over its own fate. This was the Okinawa he depicted 
in Kotōku no Ryūkyu shi (The history of the ordeal of the 
lonely islands of Ryūkyū, 1926) (Iha 1974b). 
In this book Iha ascribed the misery of Okinawa 
to its geographic location and climatic conditions. As 
he argued, Okinawa was a poor, tiny island, with few 
resources, frequently harassed by natural disasters. The 
Ryūkyūans constantly had to struggle for survival, whilst 
their neighbors in Japan enjoyed a richer life. They had 
had no choice but to embark on overseas trade which 
eventually brought wealth and prosperity to their coun-
try. But then, again, disaster struck – the invasion by 
Satsuma which was followed by a miserable period of 
enslavement. Three hundred years under the rule of Sat-
suma brought the Ryūkyūan people to a state of complete 
exhaustion. Without help from the outside – Iha referred 
to the crisis of 1920s – the Okinawans as a society would 
not be able to recover. They had even lost the capabil-
ity of expressing pain in their own language. They had 
been completely “crushed by their own history”, but the 
Japanese government and society remained indifferent to 
their misery.
Iha’s pessimistic vision of Okinawan history was 
eagerly accepted by his countrymen. On the one hand 
it enhanced their sense of belonging to the Japanese 
nation, and on the other it provided an explanation for all 
the misfortunes they had suffered at the hands of Japan. 
The Battle of Okinawa in 1945 and the American post-
war occupation only strengthened their complex of being 
Japan’s victim. But was Okinawa’s history indeed as dark 
and miserable as described by Iha? Not necessarily. Post-
war scholars have pointed out that stories of colonization 
by Satsuma should be treated with great caution. Satsuma 
had neither the will nor enough resources to meddle with 
the domestic affairs of the Ryūkyū Kingdom. The King-
dom enjoyed wide autonomy until its very last days. It is 
hard to speak of “dark times of enslavement” in the light 
of the fact that in the 18th century Ryūkyū enjoyed such 
prosperity that scholars named this period the “Second 
Golden Age”. The historian Araki Moriaki (1982) went 
even further arguing that in the long term Satsuma’s inva-
sion left a positive legacy, as the Ryūkyūans had to intro-
duce numerous reforms in order to stimulate the growth 
of local production and to satisfy Satsuma’s demands for 
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tribute. No physical colonization of Ryūkyū took place 
because Japan did not keep any troops in Okinawa, and 
the Japanese, apart from a small group of licensed mer-
chants from Satsuma, were forbidden to travel to the 
Ryūkyūs.
National unification
Iha was not the only one haunted by the problem of 
“national unification”. At the end of the 1960s, as the 
day of Okinawa’s Reversion to Japan was approaching, 
the Okinawans started being concerned about the nega-
tive consequences the reversion might bring. Old fears 
and ill-will against the Japanese people resurfaced with 
double force. In the meanwhile, scholars engaged in a 
hot debate about the problem of reunification. Some of 
them contested the prewar argument that the annexa-
tion of Ryūkyū in 1879, or the “Disposition of Ryūkyū”, 
had been an example of “national unification”. Interest-
ingly, no one had questioned the very possibility of uni-
fication in the 19th century. Okinawa was “Japanese” by 
default and hence all intellectuals perceived unification 
as desirable and in accordance with the course of history. 
Accordingly, if Japan had failed to embrace Okinawa, it 
was entirely Japan’s fault. The discussion thus concerned 
the question of what measures Japan should have taken 
in the past so that a truly national unification could have 
taken place.
Shinzato Keiji (1967, 1970) and Makise Tsuneji 
(1971) questioned the problem of national unification 
from the position of Marxism. They argued that a true uni-
fication could only take place in the course of a bourgeois 
revolution; it would have to be initiated by the masses 
(“bottom-up unification”) and not imposed by the state 
(“top-down unification”), as had in fact happened. They 
placed importance upon civil rights movements, which, in 
their opinion, disclosed positive symptoms of a “bottom-
up” unification. Kinjō Seitoku (1967: 55) raised a similar 
argument; in his opinion a true unification would only be 
possible if it came at the initiative of the people. Kinjō 
challenged the advocates of unification by noting that in 
the year following the annexation of Okinawa, the Japa-
nese government was about to cede half of the Ryūkyūs 
to China in exchange for trading privileges (the agreement 
with China was signed in 1880 but never put into practice). 
How could you explain, Kinjō rhetorically asked, that the 
same government that had “liberated” the Ryūkyūans and 
carried out “national unification”, could come up with the 
idea of dividing Ryūkyū which would be a de facto split-
up of the nation?
Not all agreed with these arguments. For Araki 
Moriaki, for example, unification had indeed taken place. 
Araki argued that the Ryūkyū Kingdom had already 
become a part of Japan much earlier – after the Satsuma 
invasion in 1609. In the light of economic integration with 
the Japanese bakuhan state, Ryūkyū should be perceived 
as a han domain. The “Disposition of Ryūkyū” in 1879 
thus should be seen as a link in the chain of events of the 
Meiji Restoration – it fell under the process of Japan’s 
centralization when daimyō had to return their lands to 
the Emperor (the so-called hanseki hōkan, or “reversion 
of registers”). What makes Okinawa’s experience unique 
is the fact that the Ryūkyūan King, unlike Japanese lords, 
did not return the land voluntarily, and thus the unifica-
tion with Japan was not carried out “autonomously” (jiri- 
tsuteki), but was rather directed from above (taritsuteki) 
(Araki 1980:199).
A younger colleague of Araki, Takara Kurayoshi 
(1989, 1998), raised a similar argument. Takara intro-
duced the idea of “gradual unification”. Whilst recog-
nizing Old Ryūkyū (prior to the Satsuma invasion) as 
an absolutely independent country, he agreed that post-
invasion Okinawa had been incorporated into the baku-
han system, though not entirely. The Satsuma invasion 
constituted the first step in the unification process, which 
continued after the “Disposition of Ryūkyū”. The last step 
was Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in 1972.
The question of bakuhan
But had Ryūkyū indeed been a part of the bakuhan 
system? This question concerns the problem of how to 
understand the term bakuhan and, in a broader context, 
how to define the early modern Japanese state. Takara 
Kurayoshi has described Ryūkyū as a foreign country 
(ikoku) within the bakuhan system (Takara, 1998: 176; 
1989b: 243): The kokudaka system8, the ban on Christian-
ity and a number of Japanese institutions were introduced 
to Ryūkyū, but the kingdom itself functioned within the 
system under slightly different conditions.
Such perception of Ryūkyūan matters, however, is 
very much Japan-centric. Is it appropriate to apply a con-
cept like bakuhan, which was coined for one particular 
state, namely Japan, to other countries in Asia? By the 
same token, we may ask whether it is correct to discuss 
early modern Japan using a European notion of statehood, 
and the answer would be definitely in the negative. Put-
ting aside the question of Japan-centrism, most Japanese 
of the Edo period would have agreed that Ryūkyū was 
a foreign country – politically as well as culturally. The 
Japanese conceptualized their country by drawing upon 
the Chinese concept of huayi (Jap. ka-i, “civilization and 
barbarity”). Like the Chinese they assumed that they rep-
resented the most civilized country located at the very 
center of the world and thus expected all other surround-
ing peoples to recognize their superiority. Huayi became 
very helpful in imagining the cultural representation of 
“us” and “others”, Japan and non-Japan.
Yet, contrary to the case of China, huayi had few 
practical implications for Japan: except for the Ryūkyūans 
MINIKOMI Nr. 82          9
and the Ainu no one had recognized Japan’s superiority, 
not to speak of suzerainty. Relations with Korea remained 
ambiguous, as the Korean king treated his Japanese coun-
terpart as equal in rank. The Dutch, who believed in the 
principle of pecunia non olet, did not mind going through 
humiliating rituals whenever they visited Edo, but they 
by no means perceived themselves as inferior to the Japa-
nese. Japan had its own vision of the world, but, as Jurgis 
Elisonas put it, remained prima in vacuo (1991: 300). 
Ryūkyū and Ezo (present-day Hokkaidō) remained the 
only countries validating the Japan-centric world order. 
This explains why Edo period Japan tried to distance 
itself from Ryūkyū and Ezo. The Japanese banned the 
Ainu people from adopting Japanese customs. In a simi-
lar fashion they did not want the Ryūkyūans to become 
too Japanese. Whenever Ryūkyūan envoys traveled to 
Edo, they received strict orders to present themselves as 
exotically as possible. For the sake of the huayi vision the 
bakufu had to keep Ryūkyū dependent on, yet separate 
from Japan.
The early modern Japanese state, described by schol-
ars as bakuhan kokka (bakuhan state) or bakuhan taisei 
(bakuhan system), should not be understood only in 
terms of its institutions and administrative organization, 
detached from and situated above society. In his book 
State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place 
(1990) Bob Jessop emphasized the relationship between 
state institutions and society. While recognizing the insti-
tutional and operational autonomy of the state and its 
function of maintaining the integrity of society, he argued 
that the state constitutes only a part of society. Accord-
ingly, the state is not a fixed and coherent system, but a 
relatively open system that is constantly renegotiated 
and subject to social forces (Jessop 1990: 338–367). Put 
simply, if the state defines and determines society, then 
society and social changes shape the state, too. Although 
Jessop wrote about capitalist states, his main argument 
could also be applied to some premodern states, like, for 
example, Japan.
In Edo period Japan social changes were very 
dynamic. Whatever the vision of the state the bakufu offi-
cials might have had, they constantly had to adjust laws 
and regulations to cover such phenomena as migration, 
urbanization and the emergence of a free market. They 
also had to cope with the rise of a powerful class of towns-
men who had challenged the social status of the samurai. 
All these changes were slowly yet successfully undermin-
ing the Confucian social order which the shogunate was 
determined to defend even at the cost of a relaxation of 
some regulations. 
Okinawa, however, was irrelevant to everything 
that was happening in Japan – at least not more relevant 
than China, Korea and the northern territories across the 
border from the Matsumae domain in Ezo. Under Japa-
nese law Ryūkyū was a foreign country and no migra-
tion was allowed between Japan and the kingdom. The 
Ryūkyūans were not part of Japanese society and there-
fore they had no share in shaping Japan. They could not 
even be compared with the eta and hinin outcastes, who 
in spite of being marginalized by the bakufu authorities 
were recognized and assigned a clearly specified position 
in society. Only in Kagoshima was there a tiny commu-
nity of Ryūkyūan officials and merchants, but they had 
the status of foreigners, similar to the Dutch and Chinese 
in Nagasaki. Put simply, Ryūkyū should not be perceived 
other than as a separate state, even if it was to a certain 
extent economically and politically dependent on Japan.
Conclusions: Okinawa and the “making 
of modern Japan”
Marius Jansen (2000), Kenneth Pyle (1996), Andrew 
Gordon (2003) and many other scholars agree that the 
Tokugawa period is crucial for understanding the rise 
of modern Japan. Social and cultural changes that took 
place in Edo period Japan laid a firm foundation for future 
modernization. As previously stated, premodern Okinawa 
was a separate country and therefore it had no share in the 
process of making modern Japan in its early stage. Japan’s 
modernization in the Meiji period and afterwards was an 
extremely dramatic process, but not without continu-
ity between premodernity and modernity. In this respect 
Okinawa’s experience was utterly different from that of 
Japan: Modernization was imposed from above, Western 
civilization had first been filtered and digested by Japan, 
and the legacy of Ryūkyū little contributed to the rise of 
modern Okinawa. It was primarily Japanese traditions, 
not Okinawan ones, that became a “mirror of modernity”. 
And this is what makes Okinawa a “different Japan.”
Notes
1 Known in English as Tiger’s Claw or Indian Coral Tree.
2 Rice brandy, similar to Japanese shōchū.
3 See for example the papers in Vlastos 1998.
4 For more on this subject see Harootunian 1998.
5 Tonaki 1996 discusses Yanagi’s concept of art in detail.
6 Lit. “eight corners, one world”; a propaganda slogan expressing a 
vision of the whole world united under one – Japanese – roof.
7 For more on Iha’s work see Kano 1993, Kinjō/Takara 1994.
8 A system of determining the value of land based on the productiv-
ity of rice, which was calculated in koku (1 koku= ca. 180 liters)
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International Conference 
“40 years since reversion: 
Negotiating the Okinawan difference in Japan today”
November 1–3, 2012
University of Vienna, Institute of East Asian Studies
The reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 was an important turning point after which Okinawa’s position within 
Japan had to be renegotiated. The image of Okinawa in Japan has undergone a paradigm change since then: 40 
years ago, politicians and intellectuals were anxious to adjust Okinawan society to Japanese standards. In this 
process, many aspects of local culture were stigmatized and deliberately suppressed. However, since the 1990s, 
more positive images of ‘Okinawan difference’ began to spread on a large scale. The question arises, whether 
these dominant discursive constructions of Okinawa as ‘different’ indicate an increasing acceptance of cultural 
difference within Japan or whether the ‘Okinawan difference’ is rather being reduced to its exotic aspects and thus 
being commercialized?
The conference aims at bringing together scholars from Japan, Europe, and North America who are experts in 
the field of research on Okinawa in various academic disciplines, thus stressing the methodological, theoretical and 
empirical diversity within the field of Okinawan studies. Interactive elements such as artist’s talks and livestream 
discussions with Okinawan participants will complement the academic program. 
The conference is funded by the Japan Foundation, The Faculty of Philological and Cultural Studies, University 
of Vienna and the Austrian Japan-Society for Science and Art (AAJ). For detailed information on the program and 
registration modalities please visit the homepage 
 http://kenkyuu.eas.univie.ac.at/index.php?id=375
